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Introduction
The economics literature offers two explanations for sovereign debt repayment. One line of reasoning is that sovereign debtors repay for reasons of reputation (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Ozler, 1993; and Kletzer and Wright, 2000) . Repayment safeguards the sovereign's reputation, granting it continued access to international capital markets in the future. The gunboat model, on the other hand, predicts that foreign creditors must be able to impose formal or informal sanctions such as a trade embargo or restrictions on trade credit to induce repayment. (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a,b; Rogoff, 1999; Cole and Kehoe, 1997) .
1 Reputation is not a sufficient condition for repayment.
The Confederate experience during the American Civil War provides an experiment to examine the role of gunboats/sanctions and reputation in promoting sovereign repayment by a country with a very poor capital market reputation. Many Confederate states had a history of default in international capital markets. Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, for example, at least partially defaulted on bonds issued in London during the 1830s and 1840s.
Jefferson Davis, future President of the Confederacy, openly supported repudiation of these debts while a member of the U.S. Senate from Mississippi in the 1840s (McGrane, 1935) . The
Confederate government also defaulted on all domestic debt obligations. The South sent a clear signal to foreign investors that they should stay away from rebel war bonds.
Despite a weak standing in international capital markets, the Confederacy managed to float two debt issues in Europe that amounted to less than two percent of Confederate war expenditures. Sold primarily in England, the cotton bonds were denominated in sterling, paid seven percent interest per year in sterling, and could be converted into cotton on demand. The 1 For a literature survey of sovereign debt, see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Obstfeld and Confederacy largely issued the ₤3 million-pound obligation in March 1863 to settle debts owed to the largest suppliers of rebel guns and military stores during the war. 2 The Confederacy had fallen into arrears on its military contracts and British creditors cut off trade credit in November 1862 and reduced supply shipments. The threat of a gun embargo induced the fledgling nation to service the cotton bonds as late as March 1865, a time of domestic hyperinflation and just one month before the fall of Richmond and Lee's surrender at Appomattox. Elsewhere, the Confederacy raised only ₤2,500 pounds by floating eight percent coupon bonds in Amsterdam.
The Confederacy never serviced its Dutch bonds. Foreign investors may have been wary of purchasing rebel war bonds because the South had a very poor capital market reputation, did not purchase many military goods in the Netherlands, and did not have assets in the Netherlands that could be seized to promote debt repayment.
Cotton bonds traded at a large premium relative to the Dutch bonds as well as all other
Confederate debt obligations. Even in January 1865, when Richmond was on the verge of collapse and nearly surrounded by Union forces, cotton bonds traded for over 50 pounds sterling (half of par), while rebel money traded for two cents on the gold dollar. The Confederate experience is consistent with direct sanctions --trade or trade credit sanctions--promoting debt repayment, but nevertheless supporting only a small amount of lending. A reputation (or another 2 Grossman and Han (1996, p. 214) argue that the South did not need to borrow from international capital markets to smooth consumption at the beginning of the war: "The South had a large amount of mobilizable resources relative to their expected post-war endowment." They calibrate a theoretical model of moral hazard that indicates foreign markets charged the Confederacy a sufficiently high interest rate such that the South did not undertake additional foreign borrowing prior to defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. One implication of their model is that the Confederacy was seen as a bad borrower because it could not credibly commit to spending enough to win the war.
type of) sanction would be needed to support a higher level of lending in international capital markets than that implied by the gunboat model alone.
The paper begins with a brief literature review of empirical studies on debt repayment. This is followed by a discussion of the origins and history of the Confederacy's poor capital market reputation. Next, the terms of the South's two foreign debt issues are examined. Then the paper explores the implications of the Confederate experience for theories of sovereign repayment.
Literature Review
Many empirical studies of sovereign repayment have compared bond returns between defaulting and non-defaulting sovereigns over different historical periods. Eichengreen and Portes (1989) , for example, examine bond returns for 125 London overseas issues as well as a sample of 250 U.S. foreign issues floated during the 1920s. They find that the "average" default reduced the internal rate of return 4.3 percent for dollar loans and approximately 2 percent for sterling loans. Alternatively, Lindert and Morton (1989) compare rates of returns on sovereign bonds for countries that defaulted and repaid their international debts between 1850 and 1970.
They find little evidence that defaulting countries were punished by creditors or denied future access to international capital markets. Tomz (2003) examines the history of sovereign default and lending over the past 300 years and finds that countries generally repaid their debts to maintain a good reputation in international capital markets.
In an important study, English (1996) (Walker, 1864, p. 392 ).
Walker's duties were not confined to publishing articles about Davis' position on sovereign default. He also traveled to leading investment houses in Europe to dissuade them from underwriting war debt on behalf of the Confederate government (Walker, 1863) . Domestic economic policy also contributed to the Confederacy's poor capital market reputation. The Confederacy was established on the basis of a weak central government that refused to pass tax legislation as well as collect levies that could be used to fund the war effort.
Taxes accounted for only 8 percent of Confederate revenues during the war (Ball, 1992) . The aversion to taxation is perhaps best described by Governor Moore of Alabama in the following statement:
"The collection of this tax, by the state would be an onerous and unpleasant duty as it imposes upon the state the necessity of enforcing the laws of the Confederate government against her own citizens" (quoted in Lerner, 1956, p. 165) .
The Southern Confederacy also tried to raise war finance through domestic capital markets. The government floated two major loans during the first two years of the war, the $15 million loan of 1861 and the $100 million loan of 1862. The Confederacy originally pledged to service the issues in specie but ultimately reneged, making interest payments in depreciated government Treasury notes. Subsequent bond issues proved less fruitful as Confederate investors sought to unload their money balances by purchasing commodities rather than government obligations. The Confederacy resorted to funding acts that artificially increased bond demand by could pay off Confederate debts in the event of Southern defeat (The Times, March 19, 1863).
However, the author of this letter was allegedly James Spence, a well-known Southern sympathizer (New York Times, December 9, 1865). compelling citizens to exchange money for bonds (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2003) . Ball (1991) estimated that debt issue accounted for approximately 33 percent of Confederate revenues during the war.
The inability to levy taxes and float bonds forced the Confederate government to rely on the printing press as its principal means of war finance. Between January 1861 and February 1864, the Confederate money supply increased 1,200 percent, rising from 100 million to more than 3,500 million (Lerner, 1955 (Lerner, , 1956 ). Commodity prices, as measured by the Lerner Price Index, rose from an index value of 100 in early 1861 to 5,300 by March 1865. Inflation averaged more than 10 percent per month during the war. Money financing accounted for approximately 59 percent of Confederate revenues (Schwab, 1901; Todd, 1954; Ball, 1991) . The Confederacy's dependence on the inflation tax further diminished its poor capital market reputation.
The Confederacy in International Capital Markets
During the first two years of the war, the Confederacy did not attempt to float debt in international capital markets. The South believed that cotton was "King" and that a self-imposed cotton embargo would draw England and France into the war. They thought that European powers, especially England, were dependent on Confederate cotton to operate their textile mills.
Although the Confederacy enjoyed considerable power in the world cotton market, many British textile mills were overstocked with Southern cotton early in the war because of a bumper crop in 1860 (Irwin, 2001) . Southern planters shipped large quantities of cotton to England shortly after South Carolina seceded from the Union in the fall of 1860. Moreover, planters were unwilling to pass legislation that would curtail cotton production or grant the Confederate government power to confiscate the staple (Lebergott, 1983a) . "King Cotton Diplomacy" not only failed to incite foreign intervention, but the Confederate government also lost an opportunity to purchase military supplies in Europe with cotton during the early stages of the war (Owsley, 1985; Ball, 1991) .
By the end of 1862, Confederate revenues from money, debt, and taxes began to fall with rising inflation. A European loan could raise specie to buy guns and ships abroad as well as replenish Confederate gold reserves and bills of exchange depleted by the purchase of arms in England. Raising funds in Europe was a difficult prospect for the Confederacy, however, as their poor capital market reputation and unclear military prospects made it difficult to find financiers that would underwrite a foreign loan. Leading investment houses, such as the Rothschilds and Barings, refused to market war debt for a pro-slavery government with such a poor capital market reputation (Ferguson, 1999; Sexton, 2001 ).
The South discussed the possibility of floating a foreign loan with several second-tier firms during the latter part of 1862. The Confederacy agreed in October to issue a 20-year, ₤3 million-pound bond obligation with Emile Erlanger and Company, a French investment house.
The sterling raised from the float could buy thousands of guns for the South, as a battle rifle cost about ₤3.5 pounds and gunships between ₤60,000 and ₤90,000 pounds, depending on their quality (Fenner, 1969) . Erlanger initially offered to float a ₤5 million pound issue, but the Confederacy declined because it did not believe it could service such a large obligation.
The twenty-year security contained several provisions to minimize the risk for investors and Erlanger and Company. The sterling denominated issue paid 3.5 percent interest semiannually (in sterling) to minimize currency risk. The issue contained a sinking-fund provision that retired one-fortieth of the principal semi-annually through a lottery drawing. The underwriting firm agreed to sell the bonds at 90 percent face value (₤90 pounds) and collect an 18 percent brokerage fee. As a result, the South received only ₤2,160,000 (72%) of the ₤3 millionpound issue (Economist, March 21, 1863) . Investors paid into the subscription over a period of months according to the following schedule: 5 percent on application, 10 percent on allotment, 10 percent on May 1, 1863, 10 percent on June 1, 1863; 10 percent on July 1, 1863; 15 percent on August 1, 1863; 15 percent on September 1, 1863, less dividend of 3.5 percent; and 15 percent on October 1, 1863. The terms of the loan also called for Erlanger to administer the first two interest and principal payments that would be paid out of a portion of the initial bond subscriptions placed in a separate account under its control (Fenner, 1969) . Erlanger received an additional 1 percent commission on all principal and interest payments made to investors. All remaining interest and principal payments would be made by the Confederate government. The small up front payment and the "guarantee" of debt service for a year were provisions obviously designed to reduce default risk for investors. cotton bonds for the duration of the war, making interest payments in sterling and exchanging the war debt for cotton in accordance with the terms of the contract.
In addition to the widely studied cotton bonds, the Confederate government also sold bonds in Amsterdam during the fall of 1863 and early 1864. The thirty-year security contained an 8 percent coupon that paid interest in sterling on January 10 and July 10 of each year (Bosch, 1948) . The bonds initially sold at 50 percent of par (par = ₤100 pounds) in sizes of ₤50, 100, 500, and 1,000 pounds. The terms of the debt contract allowed the Confederacy to convert the 5-year security into 5-30 year bonds. The issue generated little enthusiasm among Dutch investors, raising only ₤2,500 pounds from the float (Gentry, 1970) . 5 Dutch investors were apparently wary of purchasing bonds from a rebel government that defaulted on its domestic bonds and recently suffered major defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Bosch (1948) 
The Importance of Sanctions and Reputation
The Confederacy's inability to sell coupon bonds in Amsterdam and the reluctance of the Barings and Rothschilds to underwrite debt for the rebel nation shows that the country's poor credit reputation played a role in limiting the amount of capital it could raise in international markets. Table 3 presents estimates of the net proceeds of the cotton loan derived from Gentry (1970) . The Confederacy received approximately 1.519 million pounds sterling after accounting for the net loss from secret debt buybacks and resales, debts settled using repurchased cotton bonds, brokerage and commission costs paid to the French underwriting firm, and a loan secured using the cotton bonds as collateral. 6 The net proceeds from the cotton loan fall to less than 1.081 million pounds sterling if the interest and principal payments, which were largely paid out of the funds raised from the float, are subtracted from the 1.519 million pound figure. The net resource transfer amounted to less than 2 percent of Confederate war expenditures using either estimate of the net proceeds.
Although the cotton loan was quite small, there is considerable evidence that the threat of trade and trade credit sanctions enforced the war loan and debt repayment. As shown in Table 1 when Erlanger issued the cotton bonds. Table 1 shows that the Confederacy ultimately repaid its debt with SICC by giving the firm ₤135,000 pounds (market value) in cotton bonds and gold from the proceeds of the Erlanger loan in September 1863 (Fenner, 1969) .
SICC proved invaluable to the Confederate war effort. They supplied the Confederacy with Enfield rifles, the standard battle arm of "Johnny Reb" (Wise, 1988) (Sexton, 2001) . British manufacturers supplied nearly 60 percent of Confederate guns during the war (Owsley, 1951) . It was crucial for the Confederacy to service 7 One potential problem for the Confederacy was the Union blockade of Confederate ports. A blockade would make it pointless to sell bonds in Europe, as specie raised from a debt float could not easily be converted into guns. Lebergott (1983b) shows that the Union blockade was only partially effective. The capture rate for steam vessels was only 16.1 percent during the war. Fenner (1969) argues that the Confederacy's inability to borrow large sums of specie abroad, especially after defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, as well as their poor regulation of blockade runners, explains why the Confederacy did not import more military goods from Europe.
the cotton bonds so that SICC would not cut off shipments of guns and military stores that would cripple the rebel war effort. during the first year when the firm administered the loan. Another factor that promoted debt service is that the Confederacy used repurchased cotton bonds as collateral for a loan. Table 1 shows that the Confederacy obtained a ₤150,000 pound loan from John K. Gilliat and Company in 1864 by putting up ₤187,500 pounds (market value) in cotton bonds as collateral (Fenner, 1969) . Gilliat and Company negotiated shipbuilding contracts for the Confederacy. The South purchased military goods with the funds raised from the loan. The Gilliat loan represents the only time the Confederacy was able to secure a loan using repurchased cotton bonds.
Another reason the Confederacy may have serviced the cotton bonds is that important rebel shipbuilders purchased shares in the war debt. The New York Times reported December 9, 1865 that John Laird owned 200 cotton bonds. The Liverpool engineer designed and built the Laird Rams, two of the largest ironclads ever built during the Civil War (Dekay, 2002 Europe for the remainder of the war (Wise, 1988) .
9
The prospect of foreign intervention, especially by England, was another factor that may have promoted debt repayment. The Confederacy apparently believed that there might be political gain from floating war debt in Europe. Many high ranking Confederate officials thought that England might recognize the rebel nation or intervene in the conflict and negotiate an armistice.
The possibility of recognition or intervention was unlikely, however, after the Confederate defeat at Antietam in September 1862 and the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation that freed the slaves in January 1863 (Owsley, 1951) . Many Britons were unwilling to back a rebel government that supported slavery. The British cabinet ceased discussions of recognizing the Confederacy as a sovereign country in the fall of 1862. Nevertheless, Judah Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War, believed that with a major military victory, the Confederacy might be able to sway British opinion in favor of the South. Benjamin alluded to the potential political gain from issuing the cotton bonds in the following correspondence with James Slidell, the Southern diplomat in Europe entrusted with negotiating the cotton loan. 10 The Confederacy's senior diplomats in Europe, James Mason and James Slidell, also discussed the political advantages likely to be derived from selling bonds collateralized by cotton in Europe.
Consider Mason's comments on the Erlanger Loan: "These terms, although vastly better than the outline of the contract made in Paris were considered by us so onerous that we were unwilling to take the whole amount offered, and would have declined it altogether but for the political considerations indicated by Slidell" (Official Records, Vol. 3, p. 650).
"Your intimation of political advantages likely to be derived from the [cotton] loan possessed great weight, though not as much as if you had felt at liberty to express yourself more definitely. We finally agreed, in view of that intimation, to make a sacrifice…" (Emphasis in the original) (quoted in Ball, 1992, p. 76 11 There is some controversy about whether Gladstone was a cotton bondholder. Morley (1903) and Sexton (2001 ) deny Bigelow's claim (1988 , 1903 that the future Prime Minister owned Confederate cotton bonds. Morley was a close associate of Gladstone, however, and the weight of the evidence seems to support Bigelow's view. Not only did Gladstone meet with Confederate agents, but he also displayed a penchant for investing in risky debt throughout his political career.
While he was Prime Minister, he dabbled in Egyptian bonds during the Suez crisis in 1882. Hubbard, 1998, p. 147) . The failure of the Confederacy to achieve British support was also recognized by Henry Adams, a member of the United States foreign service in England, who closely monitored Confederate attempts to secure "recognition" or intervention by Her Majesty's government. Shortly after Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Adams wrote, "It is now conceded that all idea of [British] intervention is at an end" (quoted in McPherson, 1988, p. 664 Mounting battle defeats placed enormous strain on the Confederate government as they relied on the printing press to extract resources from the economy. By early 1865, the South experienced hyperinflation as monthly commodity inflation rose above 50 percent. Money and bond demand fell as citizens and speculators sold Confederate denominated securities that would become worthless in the event of defeat. Confederate Treasury notes traded for less than two cents on the gold dollar and interest rates on government debt in Richmond and Amsterdam climbed to more than 150 percent in January 1865 (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2003) .
Despite the desperate military and financial situation, the Confederacy serviced the cotton bonds in September 1864 and March 1865 (Gentry, 1970) . Figure 1 implies that financial markets understood that the cotton bonds represented the Confederacy's senior debt. The cotton bonds traded for about 50 pounds sterling (1/2 par) in January 1865, a large premium to rebel money, expressed as the gold price of 100 Confederate Treasury notes, and Dutch bonds. 13 The high price of the cotton bonds at this late stage of the war suggests that financial markets believed the South intended to service the war bonds as long as there was some hope for the "cause" (Pollard, 1994 ₤234,500. The Confederacy serviced the cotton bonds by using some of the remaining proceeds of the initial float and through the last-minute sale of ships built in Europe (Gentry, 1970) . Given the South's poor capital market reputation and their willingness to liquidate assets to make interest and principal payments, there can only be one reason to explain why the Confederacy serviced the cotton bonds: gun sanctions. In 1862 when SICC reduced gun shipments, the 13 Daily price data for the cotton bonds were collected from the Liverpool Daily Post. All available price data for the Dutch issue were collected from the Amsterdamsch Effectenblad.
Confederate money price data are taken from Weidenmier (2002) .
Confederacy again feared that British firms would cut off trade credit and the supply of military goods, crippling the rebel armies that relied primarily on foreign manufacturers. Bonds owned by the public: 1,912,171
Source: Gentry (1970, p. 166--167) a Gentry used surviving Confederate records to estimate the September 1864 and March 1865 interest and principal payments. The debt service costs for September 1864 come directly from primary source documents. For the 1865 payment, Gentry estimated the outstanding number of cotton bonds held by investors by subtracting off the number of bonds converted into cotton warrants and owned by the Confederacy. The outstanding number of cotton bonds was derived from communications between Erlanger, Southern agents in Europe, and the Confederate government. In accordance with the contract terms of the loan, she then calculates the principal payment to be 2.5 percent of the face value of bonds held by investors, and the interest payment to be 3.5 percent of the face value of the outstanding bonds. 
